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Abstract. Non–interference is a semantic program property that as-
signs confidentiality levels to data objects and prevents illicit information
flows from occurring from high to low security levels. In this paper, we
present a novel security model for global non–interference which approx-
imates non–interference as a safety property. We also propose a certifica-
tion technique for global non-interference of complete Java classes based
on rewriting logic, a very general logical and semantic framework that is
efficiently implemented in the high-level programming language Maude.
Starting from an existing Java semantics specification written in Maude,
we develop an extended, information–flow Java semantics that allows us
to correctly observe global non-interference policies. In order to achieve
a finite state transition system, we develop an abstract Java semantics
that we use for secure and effective non-interference Java analysis. The
analysis produces certificates that are independently checkable and are
small enough to be used in practice.
1 Introduction
Confidentiality is a property by which information that is related to an entity
or party is not made available or disclosed to unauthorized individuals, entities,
or processes. One way to protect confidential data is by establishing an access
control policy [12] that restricts the access to objects depending on the iden-
tity or the role performed by the user, meaning that some privilege is required
to access confidential data. A user might establish an access control policy by
stipulating that no data that is visible to other users be affected by confidential
data. Such a policy allows programs to manipulate and modify confidential data
as long as the observable data generated by those programs do not improperly
reveal information about the confidential data. A security policy of this sort
is called a non-interference policy [18] because confidential data should not in-
terfere with publicly observable data. Thus, ensuring that a program adheres
to a non-interference policy means analyzing how information flows within the
program. The mechanism for transfering information through a computing sys-
tem is called a channel. Variable updating, parameter passing, value return, file
⋆ This work has been partially supported by the EU (FEDER) and the Spanish
MEC/MICINN under grant TIN 2007-68093-C02-02.
reading and writing, and network communication are channels. Channels that
use a mechanism that is not designed for information communication are called
covert channels [38]. There are covert channels such as the control structure of
a program, termination, timing, exceptions, and resource exhaustion channels.
The information flow that occurs through channels is called explicit flow [18]
because it does not depend on the specific information that flows. The informa-
tion flow that occurs through the control structure of a program (conditionals,
loops, breaks, and exceptions) is called an implicit flow [18] because it depends
on the value of the condition that guards the control structure. In this paper,
we are interested in both explicit and implicit flows for non-interference analysis
of deterministic Java programs. However, we do not consider covert channels
such as termination, timing, exceptions, and resource exhaustion channels, i.e.,
releasing information through termination or non termination of a computation,
through the time at which an action occurs, or by the exhaustion of a finite
shared resource such as memory.
In [1,2], we proposed an abstract methodology for certifying safety properties
of Java source code. It is based on Rewriting logic (RWL) and is implemented in
Maude [14], which is a high-performance language that implements RWL [32].
In [1], we considered integer arithmetic properties that we analyzed as a safety
property, whereas in [2] we dealt with (local) non–interference of Java methods.
Non-interference is usually defined as a hyperproperty [13], i.e., a property de-
fined on a set of sets of traces, and cannot be established by simply checking
a (safety) property on a set of runs (essentially, no single run of a system can
violate non-interference). However, we are able to analyze non-interference by
observing a stronger property which can be checked as a safety3 property using
an instrumented flow sensitive semantics.
The methodology of [1,2] is as follows. Consider a Java program together with
a specification of the Java semantics. The Java program is a concrete expression
(i.e., term) that represents the initial state of the Java interpreter running the
considered Java program. The Java semantics is a specification in Maude. Given
a safety property (i.e., a system property that is defined in terms of certain events
that do not happen [30]), the unreachability of the system states that denote the
events that should never occur allows us to infer the desired safety property. Un-
reachability analysis is performed by using the standard Maude (breadth–first)
search command, which explores the entire state space of the program from an
initial system state. In the case where the unreachability test succeeds, the corre-
sponding rewriting proofs that demonstrate that those states cannot be reached
are delivered as the expected outcome certificate. Very often the unreachability
test does not succeed because there is an infinite search space; thus, we achieve a
finite search space by using abstraction [15]. In our methodology, certificates are
encoded as (abstract) rewriting sequences that (together with an encoding of the
abstraction in Maude) can be checked by standard reduction. Our methodology
3 There are other approaches for proving non–interference as a safety property, which
use self-composition [17,6], or flow sensitive security types [27].
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is an instance of Proof–carrying code (PCC), a mechanism originated by Necula
[36] for ensuring the secure behavior of programs.
This article provides a comprehensive and full-fledged formulation of the
abstract non–interference certification methodology of [2]. In that work, we fo-
cused on the methodology as well as the PCC and rewriting-based particulars
of our approach with a specific emphasis on practicality and good performance.
This paper, however, formalizes more foundational semantic security aspects,
namely: (i) the characterization of non-interference as a safety property on ex-
tended Java computations; (ii) the conditions required by Java programs in order
to ensure the correctness of our methodology; (iii) the observational capabilities
of an attacker; and (iv) the soundness of our abstract non-interference analy-
sis technique. In our previous work [2], we analyzed (local) non–interference of
Java functional methods (i.e. methods that return values). However, in this pa-
per, we are able to analyze entire Java programs, and thus, we consider global
non-interference.
This paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we recall the notion of non–
intereference and describe a mechanism to specify non-interference policies in
JML. In Section 3, we recall the specification of the Java semantics in rewriting
logic. In Section 4, we extend this semantics to handle confidential information
and formulate a non–interference certification methodology that is based on the
unreachability of undesired states in the extended semantics. In other words, by
using the extended, information-flow Java semantics, we are able to correctly
observe global non–interference policies by checking a stronger safety property
that, in our framework, implies non-interference. In Section 5, we develop an
approximation of the extended Java semantics that produces a finite search
space for any input Java program. By using this abstract semantics (which we
implement as a source-to-source transformation of the extended semantics in
Maude) we formulate our non-interference analysis and prove its soundness. We
include some experiments in Section 6. A thorough discussion of related work is
presented in Section 7. Finally, Section 8 presents our conclusions.
2 Non–interference
A non-interference policy establishes a confidentiality level for each source pro-
gram variable of primitive datatypes. It guarantees that actual values of variables
with a higher confidentiality level do not influence the output of a variable with
a lower confidentiality level during program execution [18,26,38,9,43,19]. It is
implicitly assumed that constants that appear in a program always have the
lowest confidentiality level (i.e., the considered program is authorized to access
secret data, but it does not contain secret data in its code).
A non-interference policy can be represented by a partially ordered set
〈Labels,≤〉 and a labeling function Labeling : V ar → Labels, where Labels
is the finite set of confidentiality levels, ≤ is a partial order between confiden-
tiality levels, and V ar is the set of source program variables [42,5,27]. There are
usually two confidentiality levels: Labels = {Low, High}. These represent pub-
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lic non-secret data (low confidentiality) and secret data (high confidentiality),
respectively. 〈Labels,≤〉 forms a lattice where Low is the greatest lower bound
or bottom element (⊥), High is the least upper bound or top element (⊤), and
Low < High. The join operator (⊔) is defined as Low ⊔ Low = Low; otherwise,
X⊔Y = High. Enforcing non-interference means that the values of High-labeled
source variables cannot flow to Low-labeled source variables, whereas the values
of Low-labeled source variables can flow to High-labeled source variables. The
attacker model for global non–interference that we formalize below assumes that
the attacker is passive and can only see the Low-labeled source variables of the
Java program at the initial and final states and not at the intermediate states.
Our methodology can certify programs that have temporal breaches and are still
non-interferent.
In order to express confidentiality policies, we use the Java modeling language
JML [29], which is a property specification language for Java modules. As an
interface specification language, JML can describe the names and static infor-
mation found in Java declarations of Java modules with preconditions (requires
clauses), postconditions (ensures clauses), and assert statements (assert
clauses), all of which express first–order logic statements. As a behavior specifi-
cation language, JML can describe how the module behaves when assertions are
intermixed within the Java source code. The text of an annotation can either be
in one line after the //@ marker, or in many lines enclosed between the markers
/*@ and @*/. They are ignored by traditional compilers. The initial confidential-
ity level of a variable in a Java program is written with the word setLabel as
a JML annotation (e.g. setLabel(var, High)). The confidentiality label of pro-
gram variables is Low if nothing is specified (i.e., program variables are public
by default). We do not need to specify the label of either the formal parameters
or local variables because they can be inferred from the confidentiality labels
of other program variables if they are properly initialized. These JML annota-
tions, together with the default assumption, define the labeling function of the
non–interference policy.
Example 1. Consider the following Java program borrowed from [17] that models
a bank account and the initial state given by the execution of the function main:
public class Account { int balance; //@ setLabel(balance, High);
public boolean extraService;
public Account() { balance = 0; extraService = false; }
public void writeBalance(int amount) { balance = amount;
if (balance>=10000) extraService=true; else extraService=false; }
private int readBalance() {return balance;}
public boolean readExtra() {return extraService;}
}
class System { static Account a = new Account();
public static void main(String[] args) {
int initbalance; //@ setLabel(initbalance, High);
initbalance = Integer.parseInt(args[0]);
a.writeBalance(initbalance); System.out.println(readExtra()); }}
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This non-interference policy specifies that the object field balance of the global
object a and the initialization parameter initbalance (i.e., args[0]) hold secret
data. This program is insecure w.r.t. this policy since an observer with low
access rights can obtain partial information about the variable balance via an
observation of the non–secret variable extraService.
We assume a fixed Java program PJava. V ars(PJava) denotes the set of static
source variables that may be initialized by the main function call. We denote
the set of Low program variables as Low(PJava) = {var ∈ V ars(PJava) |
Labeling(var) = Low}. A program state St is a set of value assignments to
program variables. Given var ∈ V ars(PJava) and a state St, St[var] denotes the
value of variable var in St. We model a Java program PJava as a state transi-
tion system between pairs 〈P, St〉, where P is the current, still-to-be-executed
part of the Java program PJava and St represents the current program state.
〈PJava, St0〉 denotes the initial configuration of standard program execution and
〈X, St〉 denotes a final configuration, where X stands for the empty program.
Note that we assume that every Java program properly terminates for each set
of input data (i.e., we do not consider non-terminating programs, deadlocks, or
runtime errors). We also assume deterministic Java programs, without threads
or exceptions. 7→Java is the transition relation that describes any possible one-
step transition between any two Java program states. An execution (or trace) of
PJava is a sequence 〈PJava, St0〉 7→Java · · · 〈Pi, Sti〉 7→Java · · · 7→Java 〈X, Stn〉,
which is simply denoted by 〈PJava, St0〉 7→
∗
Java 〈X, Sn〉 if the intermediate states
are irrelevant. We can also abbreviate 〈X, Sn〉 by 〈Sn〉.
We define program non–interference by using an equivalence =Low relation-
ship between states [38,42,5,31]. Roughly speaking, non-interference establishes
that any two terminating runs of a program that start from indistinguishable
initial states produce indistinguishable final states.
Definition 1 (State equality [38]). Given a Java program PJava, two states
St1 and St2 for PJava are indistinguishable at the confidentiality level Low, writ-
ten St1 =Low St2, if for all var ∈ Low(PJava), St1[var] = St2[var].
What the attacker can see from a final state is determined by a relation ≈Low.
Two executions of a program PJava are related by ≈Low if they are indistinguish-
able to the attacker [38]. The notion of non–interference is therefore paramet-
ric on ≈Low. A program is non–interferent if, whenever different initial program
states are indistinguishable at level Low, this implies that the corresponding final
states are also indistinguishable at level Low.
Definition 2 (Non–interference [38]). A Java program PJava is
non–interferent if for every pair of different program initial states St1 and St2,
and for their corresponding final program states St′1, St
′
2 such that
〈PJava, St1〉 7→
∗
Java 〈St
′
1〉 and 〈PJava, St2〉 7→
∗
Java 〈St
′
2〉, we have that St1 =Low
St2 implies St
′
1 ≈Low St
′
2.
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In this paper, we follow the standard approach in the literature that considers
St ≈Low St
′ iff St =Low St
′. Then, the non–interference condition of Definition
2 is understood as the lack of any strong dependence [38] of Low-labeled variables
on any of the High-labeled variables.
3 The Rewriting Logic Semantics of Java
In the following, we briefly recall the rewriting logic semantics of Java that was
originally given in [21] and also used by the JavaFAN verification tool [20,22]. We
refer the reader to [33] for further technical details on rewriting logic semantics.
In [21], a sufficiently large subset of full Java 1.4 language is specified in
Maude, including inheritance, polymorphism, object references, multithreading,
and dynamic object allocation. However, Java native methods and many of the
available Java built–in libraries are not supported. The specification of Java op-
erational semantics is a rewrite theory: a triple RJava = (ΣJava, EJava, RJava)
where ΣJava is an order–sorted signature; EJava = ∆Java ⊎ BJava is a set of
ΣJava–equational axioms where BJava are algebraic axioms such as associativity,
commutativity and unity, and ∆Java is a set of terminating and confluent (mod-
ulo BJava) equations. Finally, RJava is a set of ΣJava–rewrite rules that are not
required to be confluent nor terminating.
Intuitively, the sorts and function symbols in ΣJava describe the static struc-
ture of the Java program state space as an algebraic data type; the equations
in ∆Java describe the operational semantics of its deterministic features; and
the rules in RJava describe its concurrent features. Following the rewriting logic
framework [41,32], we denote by u →rJava v the fact that the concrete terms
u, v (which denote Java program states) are rewritten (at the top position, see
[21]) by using r, which is either a rule in RJava or an equation in ∆Java (both
of which are applied modulo BJava). We simply write u →Java v when the ap-
plied rule or equation is irrelevant. We denote by →∗Java the extension of →Java
to multiple rewrite steps (i.e., u →∗Java v if there exist u1, . . . , uk such that
u→Java u1 →Java u2 · · ·uk →Java v).
The rewrite theory RJava is defined on terms of a concrete sort State, with
the main state attributes (represented by means of constructor symbols of the
algebraic type State) such as fstack for handling function calls, lstack for han-
dling loops, env for assignments of variables to memory locations, and store for
assignments of memory locations to their actual values. They define an algebraic
structure that is parametric w.r.t. a generic sort Value that defines all the possible
values returned by Java functions or stored in the memory. For instance, the int
and bool constructor symbols describe Java integer and boolean values and are
defined in Maude as “op int : Int→ Value .” and “op bool : Bool→ Value .”,
where Int and Bool are the internal built–in Maude sorts that define integer
and boolean data types. Intuitively, equations in ∆Java and rules in RJava are
used to specify the changes to the program state (i.e., the changes to the mem-
ory, input/output, etc). Since we consider only deterministic Java programs, our
specification of the Java semantics in rewriting logic contains only equations
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eq k((E > E’) -> K) = k((E, E’) -> > -> K) . ---Evaluate arguments
eq k((int(I), int(I’)) -> > -> K) = k(bool(I > I’) -> K) . ---Resolve
Fig. 1. Continuation-based equations for the Java greater-than operator on in-
tegers
---First obtain location in store from variable name
eq k(Var -> K) env([Var, Loc] Env) = k(#(Loc) -> K) env([Var, Loc] Env) .
---Then obtain value stored in this location
eq k(#(Loc) -> K) store([Loc,Value] Store)
= k(Value -> K) store([Loc,Value] Store) .
Fig. 2. Continuation-based equations for variable content retrieval
---Obtain variable location and evaluate expression
eq k(Var = E -> K) env([Var, Loc] Env)
= k(E -> =(Loc) -> K) env([Var, Loc] Env) .
---Once the expression is computed, assign to location
eq k(Val -> =(Loc) -> K) = k([Val -> Loc] -> (Val -> K)) .
---General procedure to update the memory
eq k([Val -> Loc] -> K) store([Loc,Val’] ST) = k(K) store([Loc,Val] ST) .
Fig. 3. Continuation-based equations for the Java assignment operator
and no rules. The reader can find a RWL specification of the semantics of a
programming language with threads in [33,1,2].
The semantics of Java is defined in a continuation-based style [33] and speci-
fied in Maude itself. Continuations maintain the control context, which explicitly
specifies the next steps to be performed. The sequence of actions that still need
to be executed are stacked. We use letters K, K′ to denote continuation variables,
letters E, E′ to denote expressions to be evaluated, and Val, Val′ to denote values
(i.e., the result of evaluating an expression). Once the expression e on the top of
a continuation (e -> k) is evaluated, its result will be passed on to the remain-
ing continuation k. For instance, in Figure 1, the Java greater-than operation
on Java integers is specified by using continuations, where k is the constructor
symbol used to denote a continuation, -> is the constructor symbol used to con-
catenate continuations, bool is the constructor symbol used to denote a Java
boolean data, and int is the constructor symbol used to denote a Java integer
number.
One important aspect of the semantics is the handling of Java variables. In
Figure 2, we show how the contents of a Java variable are retrieved from the
store (or memory) in the Java state. The semantics of the assignment opera-
tor for the Java variables is specified in Figure 3. The if-then-else statement is
shown in Figure 4. The semantics of while statements (loops) is specified in Fig-
ure 5, where the term while E S denotes the Java iteration statement, the term
while(E, S) denotes both the while continuation and the while statement that
is expressed in terms of the if(S, S′) continuation, and lstack denotes a stack
of loops currently being executed, which is needed for a proper control of the
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--- Evaluates boolean expression keeping the then and else statements
eq k((if E S else S’) -> K) = k(E -> (if(S, S’) -> K)) .
eq k(bool(true) -> (if(S, S’) -> K)) = k(S -> K) .
eq k(bool(false) -> (if(S, S’) -> K)) = k(S’ -> K) .
Fig. 4. Continuation-based equations for if-then-else statement
--- Stack loop and transform while expression into while continuation
eq k((while E S) -> K) lstack(Lstack)
= k(while(E,S) -> popLStack -> K) lstack(while(E,S) -> K, Lstack) .
--- A while continuation is transformed into an if-then-else
eq k(while(E,S) -> K) = k(E -> if(S while ( E , S ),{}) -> K) .
--- Add semantics for popLStack
eq k(popLStack -> K) lstack(LItem,Lstack) = k(K) lstack(Lstack) .
Fig. 5. Continuation-based equations for while statement
--- The state is restored from the loop stack
eq k(break -> K) lstack(while(E,S) -> K’, Lstack) = k(K’) lstack(Lstack) .
Fig. 6. Continuation-based equations for while break statement
Java break statement. Figure 6 shows the semantic specification of the break
statement, that simply pops the stack of loops. This is important, since it can
also abruptly change the information flow. Method calls are not shown in this
paper; their semantics is simply defined by eager evaluation of all arguments of
the method (whose values are stored in new memory locations) and by creating
a new local environment that contains location assignments for formal method
parameters and local variables. Due to space limitations we do not discuss heap
manipulation here. We refer the reader to [33] for further details.
The following example illustrates the mechanization of the Java semantics.
Example 2. Consider again the Java program of Example 1 and two program
executions, respectively fed with 5000 and 10000 for the initialization parameter
initbalance. Note that the corresponding initial states are indistinguishable at
the Low confidentiality level (e.g. the only Low-labeled variable, extraService,
is set to false in both of them). The Maude command search provides built–in
breadth-first search. We ask for the final Java program state of each execution
trace (actually, in order to visualize the results, we show the output of println
Java instructions). The Maude terms EX1-MAUDE and EX2-MAUDE stand for the
Java program with the corresponding initial call (for input value 5000 and 10000,
respectively), which are compiled into a Maude expression by using a suitable
Java wrapper4:
search in PGM-SEMANTICS :
java((preprocess(EX1-MAUDE) noType . ’main < new string [i(0)] > noVal))
=>! JO:Output .
4 Available at http://fsl.cs.uiuc.edu/index.php/Rewriting_Logic_Semantics_of_Java.
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Solution 1 JO:Output --> pl(bool(false))
No more solutions.
search in PGM-SEMANTICS :
java((preprocess(EX2-MAUDE) noType . ’main < new string [i(0)] > noVal))
=>! JO:Output .
Solution 1 JO:Output --> pl(bool(true))
No more solutions.
If the attacker observes these two final states, she will appreciate the two different
values for the variable extraService.
4 Proving Non–interference by using an Extended
Instrumented Semantics
Non–interference is usually understood to be a security property and is therefore
defined as a hyperproperty [13] (i.e., a property defined on a set of sets of traces).
For instance, in Example 2, the verification process for non–interference should
check the (possibly infinite) set of (possibly infinite) sets of final states issued
from the (possibly infinite) sets of indistinguishable initial configurations. Note
that checking the final states issued from EX1-MAUDE and EX2-MAUDE is just one
of the combinations to be analyzed. In contrast, the verification process for a
safety property should simply check the traces issuing from the (possibly infinite)
set of initial configurations, which is simpler.
In this paper, we prove non-interference as a safety property by instrumenting
the Java semantics in order to dynamically keep track of the change of the confi-
dentiality labels of program variables. Intuitively, the semantic instrumentation
is defined as follows:
1. Attach a confidentiality label to each memory location; this allows us to
observe their confidentiality level at the final execution state.
2. Attach a confidentiality label to the evaluation of program expressions; this
allows us to know whether the evaluation of an expression involves high
confidentiality data.
3. Associate a confidentiality label to the evaluation of program statements,
particularly those involving conditional expressions or guards; this allows us
to determine whether the control flow at a given execution point depends
on the actual value of high confidential variables. However, this label is not
attached to each program statement. Rather it is kept as an extra attribute
of a state in the extended Java semantics. This corresponds to the notion of
a context label being updated after each evaluation step in [18,28,27], which
is introduced in the following example.
Example 3. Consider the following Java5 program TestClass that is borrowed
from [43]. We endow it with the attached non-interference policy:
5 We omit the semantics of some Java operators such as ++, ++ , and += , since they
can be defined in terms of addition ( + ) and assignment ( = ), as usual [33].
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public class Testclass { static int low=0, high; //@ setLabel(high, High);
public static void main(String[] args) {
high = Integer.parseInt(args[0]); while (high > 0) {high--;low++;} }}
Here there is an an illicit and implicit information flow from the High-labeled
source variable high to the Low-labeled source variable low. For instance, when
the variable high contains the value 0 or 1, the variable low is assigned the value
0 and 1, respectively. This implicit flow would be detected using the context
label, which is set to High after evaluating the expression high>0, and which
forces variable low to be set to High independently of the confidentiality level
of the expression low++.
In contrast to [2] where local non-interference was studied, here we consider
global non-interference (i.e., we are able to ensure a non-interference policy at
the final state of the whole Java program execution, which contains several meth-
ods, classes, and function calls). This important improvement in the verification
power (which has been hardly explored in the related literature) requires the fol-
lowing two modifications to the non-interference analysis of [2]. These changes
avoid the difficult (or costly) process of tracing the current confidentiality label
of a memory location back to the point where this location was created.
1. We introduce an additional confidentiality label (Low ≫ High), which al-
low us to represent not only the current confidentiality label of a memory
location but also to keep track, at a global level, of hazardous transitions
from an initial confidentiality label Low to High. Similarly, we introduce the
confidentiality label (High≫ Low), in order to avoid false positives where a
High–labeled variable is updated with the value of a Low–labeled expression
and then updated again with the value of a High–labeled expression.
2. In [2], we used the context label only when updating the value of a variable
in memory, as in [28,43,27,24], and when returning values as in [24]. In this
paper, we use the context label during expression evaluation, as in [5].
We describe the information-flow extended version of the rewriting logic se-
mantics of Java by the rewrite theoryRJavaE = (ΣJavaE , EJavaE , RJavaE),EJavaE =
∆JavaE ⊎BJavaE and its corresponding →JavaE rewriting relation. In the new se-
mantics, program data not only consist of standard concrete values but each
value is decorated with its corresponding confidentiality label. Formally, we con-
sider the label change LabelChange = {Low ≫ High, High ≫ Low} so that the
domain of program variables in the extended semantics is V alue × (Labels ∪
LabelChange). We write <Value,LValue> for a pair consisting of a concrete
value and its corresponding confidentiality label in Labels∪ LabelChange.
Thanks to the modularity of the rewriting logic approach to formalizing pro-
gram semantics [21], our changes to the semantics of Section 3 are incremental
and minimal. As Figures 7 and Figure 8 show, the evaluation of constants and
variables now uses the context label. As Figure 9 shows, the assignment com-
putes the new confidentiality label in terms of the previous label at the memory
location, namely NewVal = LVal’ >>> LVal. The new operator≫ is defined in
Figure 10.
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eq k(i(I) -> K) lenv(CL) = k(<int(I),CL> -> K) lenv(CL) .
eq k(b(B) -> K) lenv(CL) = k(<bool(B),CL> -> K) lenv(CL) .
Fig. 7. Extended equations for extended constant evaluation
---First obtain location in store from variable name
eq k(Var -> K) env([Var, Loc] Env) = ... .
---Then obtain value stored in this location
eq k(#(Loc) -> K) store([Loc,<Val,LVal>] Store) lenv(CL)
= k(<Val,LVal join CL> -> K) store([Loc,<Val,LVal>] Store) lenv(CL) .
Fig. 8. Extended equations for variable content retrieval
---Obtain variable location and evaluate expression
eq k(Var = E -> K) env([Var, Loc] Env) = ... .
---Once the expression is computed, assign to location
eq k(<Val,LVal> -> =(L) -> K)
= k([<Val,LVal> -> L] -> (<Val,LVal> -> K )) .
---General procedure to update the memory
eq k([<Val,LVal> -> Loc] -> K) store([Loc,<Val’,LVal’>] ST)
= k(K) store([Loc,LVal’ >>> LVal] ST) .
Fig. 9. Extended equations for the Java assignment operator
Previously Stored Label≫ New Label = New Stored Label
L ≫ L = L
Low ≫ High = Low≫ High
High ≫ Low = High≫ Low
L1 ≫ L2 ≫ L1 = L1
L1 ≫ L2 ≫ L2 = L1 ≫ L2
Fig. 10. Updating memory locations
The context label can only change due to a conditional control flow state-
ments. According to [18,5,28,27], the evaluation of its boolean guards returns
a confidentiality level that is associated to the resulting true or false value
and, possibly, a modified context label. The extended semantic equations for
the if-then-else of Figure 4 need some slight revision, which is motivated by the
following example.
Example 4. Consider the following Java method, where the value computed for
the variable low does not actually depend on the value of the high confidentiality
variable high (which only affects the temporal variable aux). This program does
fulfill the non-interference policy at the final state, which can be proved by using
our non-interference verification methodology.
class Testclass { static int low=0, high; //@ setLabel(high, High);
public static void main(String[] args) {
high = Integer.parseInt(args[0]);
int aux=0; if (high > 2) aux = 1; else aux = 0; low = 0; } }
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--- Evaluates boolean expression keeping the then and else statements
ceq k((if E S else S’) -> K) lenv(CL)
= k(E -> (if(S, S’) -> restoreLEnv(CL) -> K)) lenv(CL)
if not break-or-continue(S) and not break-or-continue(S’) .
ceq k((if E S else S’) -> K) lenv(CL) = k(E -> (if(S, S’) -> K)) lenv(CL)
if break-or-continue(S) or break-or-continue(S’) .
eq k(<bool(true),LVal> -> (if(S, S’) -> K)) lenv(CL)
= k(S -> K) lenv(CL join LVal) .
eq k(<bool(false),LVal> -> (if(S, S’) -> K)) lenv(CL)
= k(S’ -> K) lenv(CL join LVal) .
--- New equation to restore previous context label
eq k(restoreLEnv(CL) -> K) lenv(CL’) = k(K) lenv(CL) .
Fig. 11. Extended equations for the if-then-else
In order to avoid false positives during the evaluation of conditional state-
ments, we dynamically restore the previous context label after its execution.
The extended semantics equations for the if-then-else are shown in Figure 11,
where a new continuation symbol restoreLEnv is used to restore the previous
confidentiality label. However, restoring the previous context label has to be
carefully considered in the presence of break or continue statements within
a loop, since they can abruptly change the information flow as shown in the
following example.
Example 5. Consider a variation of Example 3 where the while loop has a bogus
guard together with a break statement to exit the loop:
public class Testclass { static int low=0, high; //@ setLabel(high, High);
public static void main(String[] args) {high = Integer.parseInt(args[0]);
int aux=0; while (true) {high--; low++; if (high == 0) break;} } }
As in Example 3, when the while loop ends, the variable low has the initial value
of the variable high. Whenever high 6= 0, the break statement is not executed.
In this case, the conditional guard uses High-labeled data, and the conditional
statement should not restore the previous context label. In other words, the
critical component here is not the break statement but rather the else branch
that does not contain the break.
In order to solve this problem, we check in Figure 11 whether either of the
two branches of a conditional statement contains a break or continue statement
and no other conditional statement or while loop in between. If there is such a
statement, restoreLEnv is not used. This case was not considered in [43] or in
[2], which only considered break statements within High guarded while loops.
Method invocation propagates the context label without changes as proposed
in [28] and, thus, is not shown here. Since while statements were expressed in
terms of if-then-else statements, they need a slight extension to introduce the
restorelEnv continuation (shown in Figure 12). The semantic specification of
the break statement stays the same as shown in Figure 6: the context label
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--- Stack loop and transform while expression into while continuation
eq k((while E S) -> K) lstack(Lstack) lenv(CL)
= k(while(E,S) -> restoreLEnv(CL) -> popLStack -> K)
lstack(while(E,S) -> K, Lstack) lenv(CL) .
Fig. 12. Extended equations for while statement
lenv(CL) is not modified and the restoreLEnv expression introduced by the
while statement is removed.
4.1 Proving non-interfence as a safety property
Now, we are ready to formulate a novel characterization of non-interference that
allows us to check it as a property that is verified for each possible execution
trace instead of being verified for each set of indistinguishable execution traces.
Definition 3 (Strong Non-Interference). A Java program PJava is strongly
non–interferent for a given labeling function if for every extended initial state StE1
and for its corresponding final program state StE2 given by 〈PJava, St
E
1 〉 7→
∗
JavaE
〈StE2 〉, we have that for all var ∈ Low(PJava), St
E
2 [var] = 〈V al, Low〉 for a value
V al.
Since in our model, a public variable can only have the label Low or the label
Low ≫ High, this means that in the extended execution of a program that
is not strongly non-interferent, the label of at least one program variable is
Low≫ High. Given an initial state St and a given labeling function, we denote
the corresponding extended state by StE .
Lemma 1. Consider a Java program PJava and two initial states St1 and St2
such that St1 =Low St2. Consider the two corresponding final program states St
′
1
and St′2 given by 〈PJava, St1〉 7→
∗
Java 〈St
′
1〉, 〈PJava, St2〉 7→
∗
Java 〈St
′
2〉. If there
exists var ∈ Low(PJava) such that St
′
1[var] 6= St
′
2[var], then
〈PJava, St
E
1 〉 7→
∗
JavaE 〈St
E〉 and StE [var] = 〈V al, Low ≫ High〉 for a value
V al.
Proof. Consider the two traces D1 : 〈PJava, St1〉 7→
∗
Java 〈St
′
1〉 and
D2 : 〈PJava, St2〉 7→
∗
Java 〈St
′
2〉. Let {var1, . . . , vark} ⊆ Low(PJava) be those
variables such that St′1[vari] 6= St
′
2[vari] for all 1 ≤ i ≤ k. Since we assume
k > 0, then there is at least one of those variables (say var1) and an assign-
ment statement var1 = E1 that is executed at least once in one of the two
traces (say D1). Let n be the total number of assignments in D1 to variables
{var1, . . . , vark}. Note that n is finite since execution traces are finite because
of the termination assumption. Now, we prove the result by induction on n.
1. (n = 1) Let us consider the last execution step in D1 where the assignment
var1 = E1 is executed. Then, it may happen that the assignment var1 = E1
is also executed in D2, or not. We consider these two cases separately.
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(a) If var1 = E1 is also executed in D2, then St
′
1[var1] 6= St
′
2[var1] implies
that the values for E1 are different in the two traces. Thus, expression
E1 must contain at least one variable var
′ such that the actual values
of var′ are different in the two traces when the considered assignments
to var1 are executed. Since St
′
1[var
′] 6= St′2[var
′] and n = 1, then var′ 6∈
Low(PJava). Therefore var
′ is a High confidentiality variable, hence it
has a High label in our extended semantics. This means that the label
Low≫ High is assigned to variable vari (according to Figure 10) in D1,
and the conclusion follows.
(b) If var1 = E1 is not executed in D2, then St
′
1[var1] 6= St
′
2[var1] implies
that the execution of this last assignment statement var1 = E1 in D1 is
conditioned to the result of a boolean expression containing High confi-
dentiality variables that guards a conditional (or while loop) statement
so that the assignment is executed in D1 and not in D2. Then, the assign-
ment statement var1 = E1 in D1 was executed either (i) within the then
or else branch of an if-then-else Java statement (recall that while loops
are expressed as if-then-else statements), (ii) within the then branch of
an if-then Java statement, or (iii) after evaluating a conditional expres-
sion within a while loop that includes a break expression. Note that no
other case can generate an interference condition. In all three cases, our
extended semantics assigns a High label to the boolean guard expres-
sion of such a conditional expression and the context label is set to High
(according to Figures 11 and 12) before the expression E1 is evaluated
in the statement var1 = E1. Note that in case (iii), the conditional ex-
pression propagates the High context label outside itself (according to
Figure 6), i.e. the conditional does not restore the previous context label
precisely to record that even if sequence D1 does not execute the break
statement, another possible trace (e.g. D2) can do it. Finally, in all three
cases, the expression E1 is evaluated within a High–labeled context and
then the label Low ≫ High is assigned to variable var1, independently
of whether expression E1 manipulates High confidential data or not.
2. (n > 1) Let us consider the last execution step in D1 where the assignment
vari = Ei is executed, with 1 ≤ i ≤ k. We split into two cases.
(a) If vari = Ei is also the last assignment of variables {var1, . . . , vark}
executed in D2, then St
′
1[vari] 6= St
′
2[vari] implies that the values for Ei
are different in the two traces. Thus, expression Ei must contain at least
one variable var′ such that the actual values of var′ are different in the
two traces when the considered assignments to vari are executed. Then,
let us consider whether var′ ∈ {var1, . . . , vark} or not. If it is, then by
induction hypothesis, we can assume that variable var′ has a Low≫ High
label since we can replace the execution of the last assignment vari = Ei
by a simple vari = cte (where cte is a constant) and the program will
still be interferent, due to the fact that the assignment to var′ occurs
before and could not be affected by the last assignement to vari. If
var′ 6∈ {var1, . . . , vark}, then var
′ is a High confidentiality variable and
it has a High label in our extended semantics. In both cases, the label
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Low ≫ High is assigned to variable vari (according to Figure 10), and
the conclusion follows.
(b) If vari = Ei is not the last assignment of variables {var1, . . . , vark}
executed in D2, then either there is no such an assignment in D2 to
variables {var1, . . . , vark}, or the last assignment in D2 has the form
vari = E
′, with E′ different from Ei, or it affects a variable var
′′ that
is different from vari. All three cases imply that the execution of the
last assignment statement vari = Ei in D1 is conditioned to the result
of a boolean expression containing High confidentiality variables that
guards a conditional (or while loop) statement so that such assignment
is executed in D1 and not in D2. Then this case is perfectly similar to
case (1)(b) above, and the result follows. ⊓⊔
From Lemma 1 we derive that strong non-interference implies non-interference,
as given by the following result.
Theorem 1 (Strong Non-Interference Soundness). Given a Java program
PJava, if PJava is strongly non–interferent (Definition 3), then PJava is non–
interferent (Definition 2).
Proof. (By contradiction) Assume that program PJava is strongly non–interferent
and also that PJava is interferent. Since PJava is strongly non–interferent, for every
extended initial state StE and for its corresponding final program state StE
′
given by 〈PJava, St
E〉 7→∗JavaE 〈St
E′〉, we have that for all var ∈ Low(PJava),
StE
′
[var] = 〈V al, Low〉 for a value V al. By Lemma 1 and the assumption that
PJava is interferent we have that St
E′ [var] = 〈V al, Low≫ High〉 for a value V al,
hence PJava is not strongly non–interferent, contradicting the hypothesis. ⊓⊔
The following example illustrates the mechanization of our verification method-
ology.
Example 6. Consider again the Java program of Example 1. Now, we compute
the final state in the extended Java program execution for EX1-MAUDE (for sim-
plicity we show only the value of variable extraBalance).
search in PGM-SEMANTICS-EXTENDED :
java((preprocess(EX1-MAUDE) noType . ’main < new string [i(0)] > noVal))
=>! M:Store .
Solution 1 M:Store --> store([l(6),<bool(false),Low >> High>] ...)
No more solutions.
The execution for EX2-MAUDE will also contain the label Low≫ High for variable
extraBalance.
In other words, we transform non-interference into a stronger property which
can be effectively checked in the extended semantics. Obviously, we are not able
to certify the security of all the programs that are secure, as shown in Example 7.
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Example 7. Consider the following Java program borrowed from [43].
class Testclass { static int low=0, high; //@ setLabel(high, High);
public static void main(String[] args) {high = Integer.parseInt(args[0]);
low = high; low = low - high;} }
Apparently, there is an explicit flow from variable high to variable low through
the two assignment statements. However for any execution, when program ends,
the value of variable low is always 0 so that the variable low does not depend
on the variable high. According to Definition 2, the program is non–interferent.
However, we give a false positive by using our notion of strong non-interference
since the assignment “low = high” assigns to the variable low a high confiden-
tiality label Low ≫ High and the last statement “low = low− high” does not
revert the label back to low.
The program of Example 7 cannot be verified by traditional type inference
approaches [42,46,4] either, since they fail to verify (type check) any program
with temporary breaches, e.g. Examples 4 and 7 above, whereas Example 4 is
effectively verified by using our methodology.
5 Approximating Non–interference by using an Abstract
Semantics
The extended, instrumented Java semantics defined so far allows us to develop
a technique for proving non–interference. However, this technique is still not
feasible in general because there are too many possible initial states to consider
for the safety property to be checked. In the following, we develop an abstract,
rewriting logic Java semantics that allows us to statically analyze global non–
interference. Similar to [2], the purpose of the abstract semantics is to correctly
approximate the extended computations in a finite way. Given the extended
Java semantics, where there are concrete labeled values, we simply get rid of
the values in the abstract semantics, and use their confidentiality labels as the
abstract values instead.
In the following, we develop an abstract version of the extended rewriting
logic semantics of Java developed in Section 4, which we describe by the rewrite
theory RJava# = (ΣJava# , EJava# , RJava#), EJava# = ∆Java# ⊎ BJava# and its
corresponding →Java# rewriting relation. As in Section 4, our approach for the
abstract Java semantics consists of modifying the original theory RJavaE (taking
advantage of its modularity) by abstracting the domain to Labels∪LabelChange
and introducing approximate versions of the Java constructions and operators
tailored to this domain.
An abstract interpretation (or abstraction) [16] of the program semantics is
given by an upper closure operator α : ℘(State) → ℘(State), which is mono-
tonic (for all SSt1, SSt2 ∈ ℘(State), SSt1 ⊆ SSt2 implies α(SSt1) ⊆ α(SSt2)),
idempotent (for all SSt ∈ ℘(State), α(SSt) ⊆ α(α(SSt))), and extensive (for
all SSt ∈ ℘(State), SSt ⊆ α(SSt)). In our framework, each Java program
state St ∈ State is abstracted by its closure α({St}). Our abstraction function
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rl k(LVal -> (if(S,S’) -> K)) lenv(CL) => k(S -> K) lenv(CL join LVal) .
rl k(LVal -> (if(S,S’) -> K)) lenv(CL) => k(S’ -> K) lenv(CL join LVal) .
Fig. 13. Abstract rules for the if-then-else
α : ℘(StateE)→ ℘(StateE) is a simple homomorphic extension to sets of states
of the function 2nd : Value×(Labels∪LabelChange)→ (Labels∪LabelChange),
meaning that we disregard the actual values of data.
In the abstract Java semantics, several alternative computation steps of
→JavaE are mimicked by a single abstract computation step of →Java# , reflect-
ing the fact that several distinct behaviors are compressed into a single abstract
state (i.e. set of states). The instrumentalization of the Java semantics for deal-
ing with a set of states instead of one single state implicitly means too many
modifications. Therefore, we adopt a different approach. When several →JavaE
rewrite steps are mimicked by a single abstract rewriting state leading to an
abstract Java state, and those rewrite steps apply different rules or equations,
we use concurrency at the Maude level. Despite the fact that our extended Java
semantics contains only equations and no rules, the abstract Java semantics does
contain rules in RJava# to reflect the different possible evolutions of the system.
The abstract semantics is mainly a straightforward extension of the extended
semantics. The only difference is that any set of equations that was confluent
and terminating in the extended semantics but might become non confluent
or non terminating in the abstract semantics is transformed into rules. As a
representative example, the abstract rules associated to two of the equations of
the extended semantics of the if-then-else statement are shown in Figure 13.
Now, we are ready to formalize the abstract rewriting relation→Java# , which
intuitively develops the idea of applying only one rule or equation from the
concrete Java semantics to an abstract Java state while exploring the different
alternatives in a non-deterministic way. By abuse, we denote the abstraction of a
rule α({l})→ α({r}) by α({l} → {r}). PJava denotes the sort of Java programs
PJava (i.e. PJava ∈ PJava).
Definition 4 (Abstract rewriting). We define abstract rewriting →Java#⊆
(PJava × ℘(State
E))×(PJava × ℘(State
E)) by 〈PJava1 , SSt1〉 →Java# 〈PJava2 , SSt2〉
if ∃u ∈ SSt1, ∃v ∈ SSt2 s.t. 〈PJava1 , u〉 →JavaE 〈PJava2 , v〉.
We denote by →∗Java# the extension of →Java# to multiple rewrite steps.
Lemma 2. If 〈PJava, St
E
1 〉 →
∗
JavaE 〈St
E
2 〉, then there exists SSt3 ∈ ℘(State
E)
s.t. 〈PJava, α({St
E
1 })〉 →
∗
Java# 〈SSt3〉 and St
E
2 ∈ SSt3.
Proof. (Sketch) Our abstraction consists of transforming equations into rules
and getting rid of the value component of states. Since the transformation of
a set of equations (which are confluent and terminating modulo axioms) into
rules preserves the execution traces, and (by the monotonicity, idempotency, and
extensitivity of the upper closure operator α) the removal of the value component
of states does not eliminate execution traces either, then the conclusion follows
⊓⊔
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A program is non–interferent for a given labeling function if the abstract
values (the confidentiality labels) of the Low variables in the final state of an
abstract program execution do not have the label Low≫ High.
Theorem 2 (Abstract Non-Interference Soundness). Given a Java pro-
gram PJava, PJava is non–interferent (Definition 2) if for all SSt1 ∈ ℘(State
E)
s.t. 〈PJava, SSt1〉 7→
∗
Java# 〈SSt2〉, for all St ∈ SSt2, and for all variables
var ∈ Low(PJava), St[var] = 〈V al, Low〉 for a value V al.
Proof. By contradiction. Let us assume that PJava is not non–interferent, i.e.,
there exists StE1 with 〈PJava, St
E
1 〉 7→
∗
JavaE 〈St
E
2 〉 and var ∈ Low(PJava) s.t.
StE2 [var] = 〈V al, L〉 for a value V al and L 6= Low. Since 〈PJava, St
E
1 〉 7→
∗
JavaE
〈StE2 〉, by Lemma 2, there exists SSt3 ∈ ℘(State
E) s.t. 〈PJava, α({St
E
1 })〉 →
∗
Java#
〈SSt3〉 and St
E
2 ∈ SSt3. This contradicts the assumption that for all St ∈ SSt3,
and for all variables var ∈ Low(PJava), St[var] = 〈V al
′, Low〉 for a value V al′.
⊓⊔
The following example illustrates the mechanization of the Java non-interference
analysis.
Example 8. Consider again the Java program of Example 1. By virtue of the
abstraction, we consider just one abstract initial state that safely approximates
any extended initial state and compute the corresponding abstract final states.
search in PGM-SEMANTICS-ABSTRACT :
java((preprocess(EX1-MAUDE) noType . ’main < new string [i(0)] > noVal))
=>! M:Store .
Solution 1 M:Store --> store([l(6),Low >> High] ...)
No more solutions.
Due to the transformation of some equations into rules in the abstract semantics,
there may be several execution paths but all lead to the same abstract final state.
6 Experiments
Our methodology generates a safety certificate which essentially consists of the
set of (abstract) rewriting proofs that implicitly describe the program states
which can (and cannot) be reached from a given (abstract) initial state, as il-
lustrated in Example 8. Since these proofs correspond to the execution of the
abstract Java semantics specification, which is made available to the code con-
sumer, the certificate can be unexpensively checked on the consumer side by
any standard rewrite engine by means of a rewriting process that can be very
simplified. Actually, it suffices to check that each abstract rewriting step in the
certificate is valid and that no rewriting chain has been disregarded, which essen-
tially amounts to using the matching infrastructure available within the rewriting
engine. Note that, according to the different treatment of rules and equations
in Maude, where only transitions caused by rules create new states in the space
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state, an extremely reduced certificate can be delivered by just recording the
rewrite steps given with the rules, while the rewritings using the equations are
omitted.
The abstract certification methodology described here has been implemented
in Maude6. The prototype system offers a rewriting-based program certification
service, which is able to analyze global confidentiality program properties related
to non–interference. Our certification tool can generate three types of certifi-
cates: (i) the full certificates consist of complete rewriting sequences including
all rewrite steps; (ii) the reduced rules certificates only contain the rewrite steps
that use rules; and (iii) the reduced labels certificates only record the labels of
the used rules.
Code Examples → 1 2 3 4 5
Experiment Measures ↓
Code size in LOC 27 31 48 80 117
Code size in bytes 869 924 1981 3305 3504
Code cyclomatic complexity 1 1 4 16 192
Full Cert. size (Kb) 1134 1251 4223 10619 24176
Red. Rules Cert. size (Kb) 6.1 6.3 21.1 47.1 21.3
Red. Labels Cert. size (Kb) 1.8 1.8 2.6 3.7 5.2
Full Cert. Gen. Time (ms) 10408 23574 29482 45709 84331
Red. Rules Cert. Gen. Time (ms) 7057 7030 7527 8215 9547
Red. Labels Cert. Gen. Time (ms) 7030 6700 7190 8198 9537
Table 1. Code measures, certificate sizes, and generation times
In Table 1, we analyze three key points for the practicality of our approach:
the size and complexity of the program code, the size of the three types of
certificates, and the certificate generation times. The running times are given
in milliseconds and were averaged over a sufficient number of iterations. We
considered three code measures, the code size in LOC (lines of source code), the
code size in bytes, and the cyclomatic complexity, which counts the execution
paths of a program. The experiments were performed on a laptop with a Pentium
M 1.40 GHz processor and 0.5 Gb RAM.
Program 1 consists mainly of a simple non–interferent code example bor-
rowed from [43,28]. The program has been structured into two classes. The first
class has one secret variable and one public variable, a constructor method,
two get methods, and a method that contains the non–interferent piece of code
of [43,28]. The second class is the main class with four method invocations.
Similarly, program 2 is a simple non–interferent example borrowed from [27].
It is structured into two classes. Program 3 includes three simple methods in
two classes: the non–interferent method included in program 1, an interferent
method borrowed from [43,28], and another non–interferent method borrowed
from [39]. The main method has a sequence of method invocations such that
the last invocation calls a non–interferent method, and thus the entire program
is non–interferent. Program 4 includes six simple methods, the three methods
included in program 3 and three other interferent methods also borrowed from
[43,28], including a method with a while loop and a method that calls another
6 The tool is provided with a Web interface written in Java and is publicly available
at http://www.dsic.upv.es/users/elp/toolsMaude/GlobalNI.hml .
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method. In this case, the last invoked method as well as the whole example
program are non-interferent. Similarly, program 5 includes nine simple methods,
the six examples included in program 4 plus three other interferent methods:
two interferent variations of the loop example of program 5 and an interferent
method with a return statement within a conditional statement. The source code
of our benchmarks is provided within the distribution package.
The experiments are very encouraging since they show that the reduction in
size of the certificate is very significant in all cases, with the quotient “Red. Rules
Cert. Size/Full Cert. Size” ranging from 0.54% in program 2 to 0.09% in program
5. Note that the biggest reduction occurs for the largest program. When the time
employed to generate the full and reduced rules certificates are compared, the
reduced certificate generation time vs the full certificate generation time range
from 11, 32% to 67.80%. The reduction for the biggest example (program 5) was
the largest one (11, 32%). Note that the generation time for the reduced labels
certificate were not significantly lower than the reduced rules certificate. These
results show that the technique scales up better when reduced certificates are
considered.
7 Related Work
Goguen and Meseguer [26] formalized non–interference of deterministic and ter-
minating systems as a system hyperproperty [13], i.e., a security property that
is defined for pairs of system output traces that are indistinguisable for an ob-
server. In [23], Foccardi and Gorrieri defined a stronger, security–based notion of
non–interference that considers pairs of system input/output traces. In contrast
to [23], our safety-based notion of strong non–interference only considers secret
outputs, similarly to [26].
Barthe et. al [6] develop a methodology to prove non–interference of deter-
ministic terminating programs in an imperative language with loops, condition-
als, and mutable data structures (i.e. objects). Their methodology relyies on
using Hoare logic and separation logic, and handles non–interference as a safety
property by using program self–composition with variable renaming (i.e., they
compose a program with a copy of itself without sharing memory positions).
Their method can verify non–interference of secure programs with temporary
breaches such as “low = high; low = 2”, whereas imprecise conservative type
systems [42,46,4] cannot. Also, their method can deal with Examples 4 and 7,
whereas we cannot ensure security for the last example. This proposal is complete
and sound, but the criterion is undecidable, and for the best of our knowledge
no approximation has yet been implemented.
Existing Java verification tools that use standard JML [29] as a property
specification language do not support non–interference certification. Some so-
phisticated non–interference policies can be expressed by using the JML ex-
tensions of the Krakatoa Java verification tool [19]. These JML extensions were
developed for Hoare-style assertions regarding program self-composition [6]. This
means duplicating the code of the program and makes it necessary to distinguish
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the same program variables in its two runs. These JML extensions are used to
express non–interference pre– and post–conditions, but they do not handle confi-
dentiality labels of program variables explicitly; the method assumes that all the
variables annotated with the extended JML assertions called “ni1” and “ni2”,
are labeled Low. Nevertheless, the confidentiality aspect of non–interference is
expressible using the JML specification pattern suggested in [28,43] as an in-
strument for program verification using the theorem prover PVS. Unfortunately,
this proposal abuses notation by identifying the confidentiality levels with the
values of program variables, and it does not consider important Java features
such as method calls and interruptions (break, return or continue statements)
within conditional instructions and iterations. Moreover, a specification pattern
for confidentiality cannot be created in all cases, as mentioned in [43]. A flow-
sensitive and termination-insensitive analysis for object-oriented programs based
on Hoare logic is proposed in Amtoft et. al [3]. This analysis considers pointer
aliasing that can leak confidential information. The non–interference property
is specified by using independence assertions that are written in JML. In order
to compute postconditions, the analysis uses an algorithm that is sound and
complete given some assumptions, but it does not generate a program security
proof.
Although non–interference has not been considered in current PCC imple-
mentations, there are some proposals that are based on type systems for a subset
of Java [7], Java bytecode [37,9,8], and simple imperative languages [42,27,11].
None of these use JML to express non–interference policies and none of them have
yet been implemented. In [7], a type system is proposed as a basis for deriving
a certifying compiler for a subset of Java source code with objects, inheritance,
methods and simplified exceptions. JFlow [34] and Jif [35] are security-typed
programming languages with support for enforcing information-flow and access
control with dynamic label policies, at both compile time and run time. These
compilers produce secure Java source code for verified programs. In order to
deal with program variables whose confidentiality labels are only known at run
time, dynamic labels are introduced. However, the dynamic labels of Jif have not
yet been proved to enforce secure information flow [47]. Volpano et al [42] devel-
oped an information-flow type system that can be used to check non–interference
of programs written in a generic deterministic sequential imperative language,
but this system cannot verify safe programs that have temporary breaches. In
[27], Hunt and Sands propose a flow sensitive, dynamic type system that has
not yet been implemented. It tracks syntactical dependences between program
variables in a simple imperative language without objects or function calls. Al-
though we consider only two security levels, our methodology can easily been
extended to the multilevels of confidentiality of [27,8]. Moreover, we have shown
that our analysis can achieve more precision than traditional, type-based ap-
proaches, thanks to the combination of static analysis and dynamic labeling. In
[8], Barthe et al. define the first information-flow type system for a sequential
JVM-like language with classes, objects, arrays, exceptions and method calls that
certifies non–interference in type-checked programs. The soundness was proved
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by using the theorem prover Coq, and a certified lightweight bytecode verifier
for information flow was extracted from the proof.
Wasserrab et. al present in [44] the first machine-checked correctness proof
for information-flow control that is based on program dependence graphs using
static intraprocedural slicing. The proof is formalized in Isabelle/HOL. The anal-
ysis applies to deterministic terminating programs and is flow-sensitive, object-
sensitive and context-sensitive. The machine-checked proof was instantiated for
a simple imperative language with loops and for a subset of Jinja (a definition
of Java bytecode), which must be manually annotated with security labels. This
work does not consider method calls, classes, or objects. Bavera and Bonelli [10]
present a flow-sensitive type system for verifying non–interference of bytecode,
where class fields may have different confidentality labels for different instance
objects. This methodology does not consider method calls and it does not gen-
erate checkable proofs. Moreover, as is usually the case in type-based analysis,
once the object fields and the variable labels are determined, they remain fixed
throughout the analysis. A proposal that deals with dynamic information-flow
policies is [40]. This technique is based on runtime tracking of indirect depen-
dencies between program points. While our confidentiality label tracking is also
dynamic, our approach is based on static analysis rather than runtime monitor-
ing, similarly to [27,28].
Some proposals also exist for non–interference verification that are based on
abstract interpretation [5,46,25,24,45]. However, these proposals do not gener-
ate a certificate as an outcome of the verification process, and they do not use
JML to express non–interference policies. The idea of first enriching the original
semantics of the language by pairing each data value to its security level, and
then approximating it by only considering the security level was also proposed
in [5,46]. A similar idea is used in [24], where an abstract information–flow sen-
sitive collecting semantics, which is called instruction–level security typing, for
programs with dynamic structures is proposed; here input and ouput channels
are given security levels, but the variables have no associated security levels. A
different notion of abstract non–interference is proposed in [25] that approxi-
mates the standard notion of non–interference by making it parametric relative
to input/output abstractions. In abstract non–interference, the abstract domains
encode the allowed flows that characterize the degree of precision of the knowl-
edge of a potential attacker observing the data. By using classes and class hier-
achies as abstract domains, Zanardini adopts a different perspective of abstract
non–interference for classes in [45], where the abstract value of a concrete object
is its class. Two objects (values) are indistinguishable at an abstraction level
(class) if the objects belong to the given class or if the given class is a superclass
of object classes. An algorithm for checking abstract non–interference of Java
classes is proposed that relies on class–based dependencies.
In previous work [2], we dealt with (local) non–interference of function meth-
ods regarding explicit inputs by parameter passing and explicit outputs by value
returning. The local non–interference policies considered there were required to
explicitly establish the confidentiality labels for all method parameters and vari-
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ables. In this work, however, we consider global non–interference of complete
Java classes and we do not need to explicitly state the confidentiality level for
all program variables. In [2], we worked directly with an implementation level
definition of non–interference; in this work, we provide a general and language-
independent characterization as well as a formal and rigorous relation between
the approximate properties and the security model. As in [18,5,38,28,27], we take
into account implicit information flows by considering the context confidentiality
label in expression evaluation (the context label is joined with the confidential-
ity label of the expression) and also by modifying the context label during the
evaluation of guards of conditionals and while loops. Our global policies are very
flexible since the security levels of object variables, local variables, and method
parameters may change temporarily as in [27,28,5,24,6].
8 Conclusion
In this paper, we formalize a framework for automatically certifying global non–
interference of Java programs. Our methodology relies on an (abstract) extended
semantics for Java written in rewriting logic that can be model–checked in Maude
by using Maude’s breadth-first search space exploration. In the extended seman-
tics, non-interference becomes a safety property, and we formally demonstrate
that the safety property in the extended semantics entails the semantic, non-
interference security property in the standard Java semantics. In this work, we
provide a general and abstract definition as well as a rigorous link between
the approximate properties and the security model that we consider, whereas
in our previous work [2], we worked directly with a program-level definition of
non–interference. The proposed framework fully accounts for explicit as well as
implicit flows, and allows not only the inference of rewriting logic safety proofs
but also the checking of existing ones, thus providing support for proof-carrying
code. Actually, the steps that the abstract semantics takes are recorded in order
to construct a certificate ensuring that the program satisfies the desired prop-
erty. By turning a potentially infinite labelled state space of a Java program
into a finite abstract space, the abstract semantics not only makes the approach
feasible, but also greatly reduces the size of the certificates that must be checked
on the consumer’s end.
The Java operational semantics in rewriting logic that we have used is modu-
lar and has 2635 lines of code in 4 files [21]. We have modified less than 20 of the
1527 lines of code in the main file of the original Java semantics. The abstract
operational Java semantics was developed as a source–to–source transformation
in rewriting logic and consists of 650 lines of extra code. This is equivalent to
saying that, in our current system, the trusted computing base (TCB)7 is less
than a fourth of the size of the original Java semantics (at least one order of
magnitude smaller than the standard rewriting infrastructure, and even much
smaller than other PCC systems).
7 The TCB is the part of the code that is used to check if other code can be safely
run, and it is assumed to be trusted.
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Since our approach is based on a rewriting logic semantics specification of
the full Java 1.4 language [33], the methodology developed in this work can be
easily extended to cope with exceptions, heaps, and multithreading since they
are considered in the Java rewriting logic semantics.
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